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H. G. Wells was a writing machine. Between 1895 and 1914, the most intellectually creative 
period of his life, he published thirty-two books, eight volumes of short stories, and dozens of 
essays and reviews.1 In this avalanche of words he laid the foundations of modern science fiction 
and established himself as one of the most celebrated thinkers of the time.2 Despite his 
extraordinary reputation and profile, as well as his extensive body of work on the subject, his 
contribution to debates in and over social science has attracted little attention.3 During the 
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Edwardian years Wells wrote widely about the possibilities and the limits of social inquiry, 
developing a ferocious critique of existing approaches – especially those advocating a rigorous 
science of society – as well as articulating his own utopian alternative.  
 
In what follows I investigate these writings, examining how Wells saw the emerging professional 
social sciences and how social scientists regarded him and his work. I argue that Wells’s account 
of social science in general, and sociology in particular, was shaped by an idiosyncratic 
philosophical pragmatism. Although philosophical arguments infused his writings on present and 
future societies, scholars of Wells, and of the history of pragmatism, have failed to recognise the 
distinctive pragmatist character of his vision. Section I outlines his main philosophical 
commitments, while Section II discusses the role he played in founding the discipline of 
Sociology in Britain, as well as his conception of how the field should develop. To demonstrate 
the relationship between his philosophy and his social analysis, Section III explores Wells’s 
assault on prevailing theories of race, while also probing the limits of his critique. Finally, Section 
V traces the reception of his ideas on both sides of the Atlantic during the opening two decades 
of the twentieth century. Although his utopian method attracted few disciples, his analysis of the 
transformation of modern societies found a large audience, and he was a significant presence in 
both public and scholarly debates. Wells was the most high-profile pragmatist social and political 
thinker during the opening two decades of the twentieth century. 
 
 




Wells observed once that his was a “Balfourian age” characterised by epistemic doubt about 
religion, ethics, and politics.4 It was a time of both trepidation and excitement, and it had, he 
wrote a few years later, provoked an “intellectual spring unprecedented in the world’s history.”5 
While Darwinism was the pivotal development, opening new visas on history and human 
destiny, a philosophical revolution was also unfolding, with potentially transformative 
consequences. Wells was happy to acknowledge that Athens had witnessed the peak of human 
intellectual achievement, but he was adamant that late nineteenth century philosophical work 
bore comparison.6 Its most important expression was the “revival and restatement of 
nominalism under the name of pragmatism.”7 He saw himself as part of the revolutionary 
vanguard. 
 
During the Edwardian years Wells sought a synthesis of evolutionary theory and pragmatist 
philosophy. Viewing the world as part of an unfolding evolutionary scheme, he adopted the 
modified Darwinian framework propagated by his one-time teacher T. H. Huxley in the 1880s 
and early 1890s. Huxley had argued that it was necessary to distinguish “cosmic” and “ethical” 
evolutionary processes, while insisting that the latter always constrained and threatened the 
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former.8 He challenged both those who invoked the logic of natural selection to explain human 
development and those who denied that Darwinian competition played a significant role in 
human history. Wells likewise delineated “artificial” from “natural” evolutionary processes, 
though he drew more optimistic political conclusions than Huxley.9 While Huxley posited that 
cosmic constraints precluded radical social transformation, Wells spent much of his career 
arguing that such change was both possible and necessary.  
 
Most existing scholarship on Wells emphasizes his debt to Huxley. Howver, this is only half the 
story. As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, Wells’s thought, perhaps especially during the 
Edwardian years, cannot be properly understood without recognising his commitment to 
pragmatism.10 Given that Wells was clear about his own philosophical views, and their 
significance for understanding his writings, it is surprising that scholars of his social and political 
thought have paid so little attention to the subject. Discussion of pragmatism punctuates his 
writings. All of his thinking, he announced in a note to the reader at the start of A Modern Utopia, 
rested on “heretical metaphysical scepticism.”11 In the early Edwardian years he aligned himself 
with William James and, to a lesser extent, the Oxford philosopher F. C. S. Schiller, the leading 
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European exponent of pragmatism.12 (He did not engage with Peirce or Dewey). In the 1930s 
Wells informed a German correspondent, the philologist Fritz Krog, that during the eatrly 
twentieth century he had “assimilated Pragmatism,” and in particular the work of James, 
“completely.”13 Wells outlined his position in “Scepticism of the Instrument,” published in Mind 
in 1904 and reprinted the following year as an Appendix to A Modern Utopia, and he developed it 
further in First and Last Things, his most important philosophical text. The book, he informed 
Schiller, was written on “sound pragmatic lines.”14 We need to take these pronouncements 
seriously in order to grasp the character of his social and political thought.  
 
Wells’s pragmatism had four main components: a nominalist metaphysics; a pragmatist theory of 
truth (roughly, as verification through experiment); a version of James’s “will to believe” that 
helped to motivate his fervent advocacy of a future liberal-socialist utopia; and a conception of 
                                                          
12 For a discussion of Schiller, see Wells, “Scepticism of the Instrument,” Mind, 13/51 (1904), 
379-93, at 381; First and Last Things, 31. On Schiller’s thought, see Mark J. Porrovecchio, F. C. S. 
Schiller and the Dawn of Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel (Boulder, 2011); Admir 
Skodo, “Eugenics and Pragmatism: F. C. S. Schiller’s Philosophical Politics,” Modern Intellectual 
History (2015, Firstview). 
13 Wells to Krog, 4 May 1936, in Sylvia Hardy, “H. G. Wells and William James: A Pragmatic 
Approach,” in Steven McLean, eds., H. G. Wells: Interdisciplinary Essays (Newcastle, 2008), 142-3. 
Hardy pioneered the pragmatist reading of Wells’s views on language. See also Wells’s comment 
from 1942 that at the turn of the century he had laboured “under the influence” of James’s Will 
to Believe: Wells, The Conquest of Time (London, 1942), 1. 
14 Schiller to Wells, 1/3/08, Folder S-080, Wells Archive, University of Illinois. See also Schiller 
to James, August 1904, The Correspondence of William James, ed. Ignas Skrupskelis and Elizabeth 
Berkeley (Charlottesville, 2002), X, 622.  
6 
 
philosophy as dedicated to elucidating and clarifying problems to facilitate (better) practice. 
“[M]ost of the troubles of humanity are really misunderstandings,” he claimed, and in 
“expressing things, rendering things to each other, discussing our differences, clearing up the 
metaphysical conceptions upon which differences are discussed,” philosophical reflection could 
eliminate the “confusion of purposes” besetting humanity.15 For Wells as for James, pragmatism 
was the most apposite philosophical position to adopt in a Darwinian world. James respected 
Wells’s philosophical acumen. “Why can Wells,” he once asked his neighbour, “without any 
philosophical training, write philosophy as well as the best of them?”16 He was also clear about 
Wells’s philosophical identity: “You’re a pragmatist!”17 Indeed he regarded Wells as a leading 
expositor of the gospel, blessed with extraordinary powers of persuasion. Like Tolstoy, he had 
the gift of “contagious speech,” speech capable of setting a “similar mood vibrating in the 
reader.” Wells could inspire people, converting them to the creed. James welcomed First and Last 
Things as a “great achievement,” declaring that it should be “used as a textbook in all the colleges 
of the world.” Wells, he continued, had put his “finger accurately on the true emphases and (in 
the main) on what seem to me the true solutions.”18 Given Wells’s own proud self-identification 
as a pragmatist, and his recognition as such by assorted contemporary thinkers, including James 
and Schiller, he should be seen the most prominent fin de siècle pragmatist political thinker.19 
Doing so involves rewriting the early history of pragmatism, from which he is currently absent. 
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Nominalism lay at the heart of Wells’s pragmatism. He combined two claims. First, evolution 
had produced a human cognitive apparatus that was poorly designed to grasp the complexity of 
the world. And second, the world itself was composed of “unique,” non-identical particulars. 
This had deep consequences for the powers of human thought. The nominalist revolution, he 
proclaimed, “consists in the reassertion of the importance of the individual instance as against 
the generalization.”20 Absolute truth was chimerical. “All propositions,” he asserted, “are 
approximations to an elusive truth.”21 Generalization, classification, intellectualism, abstraction: 
all were philosophically suspect. Such provisional truths as were ascertainable were (fallible) 
products of repeated experimentation and practical verification. Even scientific “laws” were 
provisional hypotheses. In Schiller’s terms, “axioms” were simply “postulates” that had 
demonstrated their value over time.22 For Wells, pragmatism necessitated the “abandonment of 
infinite assumptions” and the “extension of the experimental spirit to all human interests.”23 
Wells dwelt repeatedly on the implications of his nominalist metaphysics. It shaped his vision of 
society and politics, the nature of inquiry, and the meaning of the self. He combined (rather 
awkwardly) a demand for epistemic humility – “Man, thinking Man, suffers from intellectual 
over-confidence and a vain belief in the universal validity of reasoning”24 – with a hugely 
ambitious vision of what ideas (and intellectuals) could do in moulding human destiny. While 
absolute truth was inaccessible, he contended that it was essential to develop political and moral 
ideals, for without them concerted human action was impossible. Human progress required 
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adherence to, and acting on, beliefs that were recognised as “arbitrary,” but which nevertheless 
served a valuable practical purpose – for Wells, that purpose was to bring about a socialist dawn 
and the eventual creation of a world state.25 This was the overriding ambition of his work, the 
function of his art. “My beliefs, my dogmas, my rules,” he wrote in First and Last Things, “are 
made for my campaigning needs, like the knapsack and water bottle of a Cockney soldier 
invading some stupendous mountain gorge.”26 Reorienting social science was but one campaign 
in Wells’s war on social and political complacency. 
In A Modern Utopia, his elaborate sketch of a post-Darwin ideal society, Wells foregrounded the 
importance of the pragmatist “insurgent philosophical movement,” suggesting that the Utopians 
had succeeded in establishing a worldwide community on a pragmatist “science of human 
association.”27 It likewise structured many of the arguments in New Worlds for Old, his popular 
account of socialism. In the autobiographical novel The New Machiavelli, Wells once again flagged 
the significance of pragmatism. “[My] sympathies,” declared Richard Remington, the chief 
protagonist, “have always been Pragmatist. I belong almost by nature to that school of 
Pragmatism that…bases itself upon a denial of the reality of classes, and of the validity of general 
laws.” In contrast, the Baileys – Wells’s parody of Beatrice and Sidney Webb – “classified 
everything.” As with most people lacking in “metaphysical aptitude” and training, they adhered 
to the crude “realist” view that “classes were real and independent of their individuals.”28 As 
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such, they failed to comprehend the social world and its latent possibilities. This unflattering 
portrait of his Fabian sparring partners staged the intellectual clash that Wells’s methodological 
writings on social science aimed to resolve.  
 
The Dreambook of Sociology 
The late nineteenth century saw the rapid development of social science disciplines throughout 
Europe and the United States. Anthropology, Geography Sociology, Psychology, Economics, 
Political Science: all began the uneven and contested process of professionalization.29 Some were 
more successful than others. While Sociology flourished in France, Germany, and the United 
States, it failed to gain much institutional support or intellectual credibility in Britain during the 
early twentieth century.30 This was not for want of effort. In 1903 the Sociological Society was 
founded, chiefly through the logistical efforts of the Scottish businessman-cum-sociologist 
Victor Branford, a loyal disciple of Patrick Geddes.31 Wells was present at the creation. His first 
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book of social prophecy, Anticipations, published in 1901, had established his reputation as a 
penetrating analyst of modernity. It drew the attention of Graham Walls and the Webbs, leading 
to invitations to join the Fabian Society and the Co-efficients dining group.32 He was invited to 
the conference that inaugurated the Society in June 1903, and in December he was co-opted to 
serve on its Executive Committee (later Council). Wells was keen to see it thrive. “I hope you are 
going to help with the new sociological society we are trying to get together,” he wrote to the 
young radical Ralph Mudie-Smith in February 1904, encouraging him to submit material to the 
planned “Sociological Review.”33 During 1903-4 Wells agitated for a chair in the subject, though 
it is unclear whether he applied for the newly-endowed Martin White professorship at the LSE. 
He once complained to Branford that he felt unable to participate fully in the Society “because I 
have to earn my living,” and as such had to chase writing commissions.34 His brief campaign 
culminated in a letter to Balfour, then Prime Minister, appealing for the government to endow a 
research position for him. “There’s a good deal of activity in the direction of sociology and a 
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certain amount of irregular disorganized endowment & I believe if I could be let loose in this 
field for a time I could give things a trend.” For example, he would write a “text-book of 
Sociology” that would be “a seminal sort of work.”35 He was nothing if not confident in his 
powers of originality. The request was rejected. Wells resigned from the Society in February 
1907, though not, he insisted, “from any lack of interest” in its work.36 He maintained a close 
interest in the social sciences for the rest of his life.  
 
Methodologically ecumenical, the Society encompassed research on the “whole phenomena of 
society.”37 Its pluralism was both a shrewd strategy for drawing together disparate types of work 
and an embodiment of Branford’s Comtean vision of sociology as a synthetic project. But it was 
not enough. From the outset the Society was divided into three competing sects – “civic” 
sociologists, eugenicists, and moral philosophers – who fought for authority over the nebulous 
field. The civic sociologists, lead by Geddes and Branford, thought that sociology should focus 
on the city as both a site and agent of social change. The eugenicists, following the lead of 
Francis Galton, emphasized the primacy of evolutionary biology, arguing that sociology should 
identify, and work to eliminate, dysgenic features that undermined social efficiency. The 
philosophers, led by L. T. Hobhouse, envisaged sociology as a general moral science, dedicated 
to elucidating the underlying rationality of social progress.38 Claimed by members of each, Wells 
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never fitted neatly into any of them. Although a eugenicist, he was critical of Galton’s program, 
believing it scientifically untenable and socially iniquitous.39 According to Branford, Wells, “more 
than anyone else, perhaps, in the English-speaking world,” had mapped “the incipient changes in 
city development which are being effected by [the] new secular orders of applied physical 
science.”40 Yet Wells did not think that cities should be the primary unit of sociological analysis – 
he painted on a far broader canvas. And although Wells accepted the importance of philosophy, 
he rejected the neo-Hegelian idealism that dominated British social thought.41 
 
Wells first articulated his vision of sociology in “The So-Called Science of Sociology,” an article 
published in The Independent Review in May 1906. Branford, who had previously attempted to 
recruit Wells to speak at the Society, tried to persuade him to refine his published views for a 
new talk. Praising Wells’s intervention as “strikingly original,” he suggested that it would be a 
service to the scholarly world if he elaborated the argument in more detail.42 Reluctant to write 
something without payment, Wells first asked Branford to republish his existing essay in the 
Sociological Papers – a request Branford politely declined – before finally agreeing to present a 
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reworked version.43  He presented it, under the same name, at a meeting of the Society chaired 
by Geddes at the LSE in January 1906. Although there were some differences between the texts 
– in particular, the first was framed more explicitly as a reflection on the methodological 
arguments of Durkheim and Branford published in Volume I of Sociological Papers – the substance 
of the argument was identical. The expanded paper was published in Volume III of Sociological 
Papers and reprinted in An Englishman Looks at the World. Drawing on his pragmatism, Wells 
argued that sociology could never be a true science, except in the “same loose sense that modern 
history is a science.”44 Sociologists had to recalibrate their ambitions. 
 
Perusing the first volume of Sociological Papers, Wells mused, was enough to highlight the 
intellectual confusion hobbling the field. The term sociology was applied to scholars engaged in 
very different types of inquiry. Benjamin Kidd, Beattie Crozier, Sebald Steinmetz, Vicomte 
Combes de Lestrade, Franklin Giddings: all offered conflicting visions of sociological 
investigation. It also encompassed work that was “not primarily sociological at all,” including 
that of Sidney Webb, Moisey Ostrogorski, and Gustave Le Bon.45 One response – articulated by 
Durkheim – was to create a synthetic science, unifying these disparate strands.46 However, the 
synthesizing ambition was based on a misunderstanding of science. Wells was (and is) often seen 
as an avatar of scientific rationality, convinced of the need to bring science to bear on all social 
problems. For his friend and critic G. K. Chesterton, Wells was a man who believed most 
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fervently that “science would take charge of the future.”47 Yet this popular assessment misses 
how Wells wielded his pragmatist scepticism against inflated claims of scientific certainty. 
Conflating truth with utility, scientists were prone to believe that the abstractions they employed 
were real, rather than useful fictions. “The man trained solely in science falls easily into a 
superstitious attitude; he is overdone with classification.” Consequently, scientists mistakenly 
thought that “exact knowledge” was possible “everywhere,” and dismissed the validity of beliefs 
that were incapable of scientific proof.48 In good Jamesian fashion, Wells rejected both of these 
claims.  
 
The sciences could be classified according to how they dealt with the “gradation in the 
importance of the instance.” It was least significant in physics and chemistry, more salient in 
biology, and acute in the study of human society. This point, Wells asserted, had received 
insufficient attention from social scientists, despite its profound implications for the credibility of 
their work – here was his claim to methodological innovation. It was now widely accepted, Wells 
continued, that there were “no identically similar objective experiences,” and instead the 
“disposition is to conceive all real objective being as individual and unique.” The human mind 
had a powerful “labour-saving” tendency to equate individuals under a given classification “as 
though they were true to sample” – “a thousand bricks or a thousand sheep or a thousand 
sociologists” – but this was an error. Even scientists fell prey to it. Thus chemists routinely 
assumed that all atoms or ions were identical.49 Such classificatory assumptions made little 
practical difference to chemists and physicists, as the impressive results of the physical scientists 
demonstrated. However, they were the exception not the rule.  
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If we quite boldly face the fact that hard positive methods are less and less successful just 
in proportion as our ‘ologies’ deal with larger and less numerous individuals; if we admit 
that we become less ‘scientific’ as we ascend the scale of the sciences, and that we do and 
must change our method, then, it is humbly submitted, we shall be in a much better 
position to consider the question of ‘approaching’ sociology.50 
 
The magnificent results of physics and chemistry mislead people into believing that classification 
and generalisation were reliable means of producing objective truth. But the success of a given 
generalisation “was no proof whatever of its final truth.”51 The work of Darwin, Wells averred, 
had dissolved rigid classifications, demonstrating the “element of inexactness running through all 
things.” The pragmatists had further unpicked the fallacies grounding folk views of science and 
truth. Wells proclaimed confidently that the “uniqueness of individuals is the objective truth,” 
while “counting, classification, measurement, the whole fabric of mathematics, is subjective and 
deceitful.”52 
 
The key problem in sociology, he argued, was that there was only one unit of analysis – human 
society. Yet the smaller the sample size, “the amount of variety and inexactness of generalisation 
increases, because individuality tells more and more.”53 Accuracy became increasingly difficult to 
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attain. It was feasible, for example, to make felicitous generalisations about billions of people, 
just as it was about atoms, but social inquiry did not have that luxury. 
 
And we are forced to conclude that not only is the method of observation, experiment, 
and verification left far down the scale, but that the method of classification under types, 
which has served so useful a purpose in … the subjects involving numerous but a finite 
number of units, has also to be abandoned in social science. We cannot put humanity 
into a museum or dry it for examination; our one single still living specimen is all history, 
all anthropology, and the fluctuating world of men. There is no satisfactory means of 
dividing it, and nothing else in the real world with which to compare it.54 
 
It was impossible to fully isolate groups of people, or trace anything but “rude general 
resemblances” between them “The alleged units have as much individuality as pieces of cloud; 
they come, they go, they fuse, they separate.” Assorted attempts had been made to circumvent 
this problem. Herbert Spencer, for example, disaggregated humanity into self-contained societies 
that “competed one with another and died and reproduced just like animals,” while political 
economists, following Friedrich List, had “for the purposes of fiscal controversy discovered 
economic types.” Wells expressed surprise that serious thinkers were persuaded by such blatantly 
deceptive moves. Human societies were not rigidly bounded, nor were they sufficiently alike to 
render them equivalent.55 Uniqueness ruled.  
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While keen to make his mark on sociology, Wells’s critique applied to all forms of social 
investigation. His writings during the Edwardian era were studded with attacks on political 
economy, the history of which, he wrote disdainfully, was “one of the most striking instances of 
the mischief wrought by intellectual minds devoid of vision in the entire history of human 
thought.”56 In A Modern Utopia he dismissed contemporary political economy – obsessed with 
“tortuous abstraction” – as comprising little more than “a hopeless muddle of social 
assumptions and preposterous psychology, and a few geographical and physical generalizations.” 
Upon such “quicksands,” rose an intellectual edifice that aped the authority of natural science, 
relied on an opaque technical jargon and falsely proclaimed the discovery of immutable “laws.”57 
He returned to the theme in New Worlds for Old. Political economists, he mocked, sought to 
provide the subject with “precision and conviction such a subject will not stand.” They 
employed “such words as ‘value,”’ an incurably and necessarily vague word, ‘rent,’ the name of the 
specific relation of landlord and tenant, and ‘capital,’” and attempted to define them “with 
relentless exactness and use them with inevitable effect.” In doing so, they “departed more and 
more from reality.”58 They had failed to absorb the teachings of pragmatism. Wells’s attack 
worked on two levels. First, he argued that the cloud of abstractions employed by economists 
failed to capture a world of uniques, and secondly, that the “immutable” laws of economics – 
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whether liberal or Marxist – were (if they existed at all) little more than “plastic human 
conventions.”59 Wells’s Utopians eliminated the discipline of economics: most of its subject 
matter had either been abolished (through the dissolution of nation-states) or incorporated into 
psychology. Psychology in turn formed part of a “general science of Sociology” dedicated to “an 
exhaustive study of the reaction of people upon each other and of all possible relationships.”60 
Subsuming all other domains of knowledge about human relations and institutions, sociology 
had the potential to serve as the ur-social science.  
 
In an early address to the Sociological Society, Durkheim credited Comte with the idea of 
“extending natural law to societies,” although he concluded that his compatriot, like Spencer, 
was more of a philosophical speculator than a real (social) scientist.61 Most sociologists followed 
the “Comte-Spencer tradition” of seeking to discover “general laws” by evolutionary speculation 
rather than rigorous scientific observation. Wells agreed with Durkheim’s diagnosis, but rejected 
his proposed cure. The purpose of “The So-Called Science of Sociology,” Wells proclaimed, was 
to expose Comte and Spencer as “pseudoscientific interlopers.”62 Believing his work to be “as 
exact and universally valid as mathematics,” Comte’s intricate system was based on a fallacious 
“arbitrary assumption”: that the “whole universe of being” was measurable, calculable, and 
predictable.63 However, Wells argued, the universe was characterised by eternal “becoming,” not 
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static “being.” It was not calculable, knowable and measurable in the way Comte imagined.64 
Spencer’s continuing influence likewise frustrated Wells. A walking taxonomer, “[h]is mind was 
invaded by the idea of classification, by memories of specimens and museums.”65 Moreover, he 
was committed to an outdated (Lamarckian) view of evolution, in which the “universe, and every 
sort of thing in it, moves from the simple and homogenous to the complex and 
heterogeneous.”66 Spencer embodied the obsession with classification, generalisation and 
abstraction that Wells’s rejected on pragmatist grounds. 
 
For Wells, human history was the history of ideas crystallised into institutions, laws and values. 
Yet the ideational foundations of society were frequently taken for granted. In The Future in 
America he complained that  
 
It is curious how little we, who live in the dawning light of a new time, question the 
intellectual assumptions of the social order about us. We find ourselves in a life of huge 
confusions and many cruelties, we plan this and that to remedy and improve, but very 
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few of us go down to the ideas that begot these ugly conditions, the laws, the usages and 
liberties that are now in their detailed expansion so perplexing, intricate, and 
overwhelming. Yet the life of man is altogether made up of will cast into the mould of 
idea, and only by correcting ideas, changing ideas and replacing ideas are any 
ameliorations and advances to be achieved in human destiny.67  
 
Wells’s social and political writing was intended to expose the contingency of existing institutions 
(such as property) and values (such as capitalist hyper-competitiveness), and to fabulate more 
attractive alternatives to help guide social action.68  James read Wells’s work in a similar vein. He 
celebrated A Modern Utopia as giving a “shove to the practical thought of the next generation that 
will be amongst the greatest of its influences of good,” and predicted that New Worlds for Old – 
which provoked his “loud and prolonged applause” – would be seen as an “‘epoch-making’ and 
tremendously influential document.”69 For James, Wells’s unrivalled capacity to communicate the 
tenets of (Jamesian) pragmatism to a wide audience, combined with his extraordinary ability to 
imagine future societies, was a powerful weapon in the fight for social reform.  
 
Sociology, Wells argued, must acknowledge both the severe epistemological limits of inquiry and 
the ontological character of its subject matter – it must, that is, eschew the search for a science of 
society and adapt itself to a world of uniques. The “subjective element, which is beauty, must 
coalesce with the objective, which is truth,” and the field “must be neither art simply nor science 
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in the narrow meaning of the word at all, but knowledge rendered imaginatively, and with an 
element of personality.” It was, in other words, a form of literature, “in the highest sense of the 
term.”70 It should encompass two distinct though complementary enterprises: social history and 
utopian speculation. The former was subdivided into a “descriptive” variant, harvesting factual 
knowledge about past societies, and a more synthetic project that developed perspicacious 
interpretations from such material. Examples of this latter genre included Crozier’s History of 
Intellectual Development, Buckle’s History of Civilisation, and Lecky’s History of European Morals – all 
were “essentially sociology.”71 History was important to sociological investigation because it 
traced how human will was cast into idea and institutional form, and exposed the multiple paths 
not taken, the ideas forgotten or repressed. Pulsing through history, Wells insisted, was a human 
striving for a better world, a future devoid of suffering, pain and sorrow – this “very complex, 
imperfect, elusive idea” was “the Social Idea,” which could be discerned “struggling to exist and 
realise itself in a world of egotisms, animalisms, and brute matter,” sometimes successful, 
sometimes not, but ultimately acting as the motor of human progress. Historical research would 
furnish an account of the multitude of “suggestions in circumstance and experience of [the] Idea 
of Society,” as well as teaching valuable lessons about past failures to fully realize it.72  
 
The other element of Wells’s vision centred on human desire. Sociology could never be an 
ethically neutral enterprise, dedicated to ascertaining objective truths about the world – it was 
necessarily value-laden. Instead, the sociologist should elaborate attractive utopian visions and 
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engage in relentless, constructive criticism of visions of the future.73 This demanded a remapping 
of the sociological canon. Plato’s Republic and Laws – both exerting a deep impression on Wells – 
were “frankly Utopian,” while Aristotle engaged in the sustained criticism of utopia. Thomas 
More and Francis Bacon should be read as sociologists. Even Comte warranted a place: his 
“intensely personal Utopia of a Western Republic” was “his one meritorious gift to the world.”74 
A Modern Utopia, Wells’s attempt to revitalise the genre, was a case study for the new discipline. 
He envisaged a vast compendium of utopian texts, a palimpsest of visions of a better society that 
would educate people about possible worlds and motivate them to act – this was the “dream 
book” of sociology. Drawing from this virtual archive, sociologists could compare and contrast 
past historical patterns with future possibilities, in a dialectical dance of the imagination. 
Sociology would be a new moral science.  
 
Delerium: The Pseudoscience of Race  
 
Wells was horrified by the fin de siècle obsession with racial science. “[J]ust now,” he warned in A 
Modern Utopia, “the world is in a sort of delirium about race and the racial struggle,” a delirium 
legitimated by a “vast edifice of sham science.”75 Two years later, in a letter to Nature, he 
castigated “the nonsense people will talk under the influence of race mania.”76 This mania had to 
be confronted, for it underwrote some of the worst problems facing humanity. “I am convinced 
myself,” he wrote in The Independent, in 1907 
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…that there is no more evil thing in this present world than Race Prejudice; none at all. I 
write deliberately – it is the worst single thing in life now. It justifies and holds together 
more baseness, cruelly and abomination than any other sort of error in the world. Thru 
its body runs the black blood of coarse lust, suspicion, jealousy and persecution and all 
the darkest passions of the human soul.77 
 
While Wells often employed national and ethnic stereotypes, and occasionally utilised racist 
language, he consistently rejected the authority of racial science, and he was unusually vehement 
in denouncing bigotry.78 His scepticism about contemporary accounts of race was derived, in 
large part, from his pragmatism.  
 
Wells’s most sustained discussion of racial theory is in Chapter 10 of A Modern Utopia. Devotees 
of a pragmatist “philosophy of the unique,” the inhabitants of Utopia adhered to a “science of 
human association” that was profoundly sceptical about the truth-value of classification and 
generalisation. While philosophers were trained “to regard all such generalizations with 
suspicion,” the Utopian and the statesman were taught “to mingle something very like animosity 
with that suspicion,” because “crude classification and false generalizations” were the “curse of 
all organized human life.” This was, of course, intended as a critique of his contemporaries, 
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obsessed with the search for essences and “stupid generalizations” about human collectives. 
Three main “aggregator ideas” shaped British public debate: nationality, religion, and 
imperialism. Despite their manifold differences, these “aggregators” all defined themselves in 
opposition to that which lay outside of them. This ubiquitous othering process had recently 
assumed a racialised form – we are witnessing, Wells complained, an “extraordinary 
intensifications of racial definition,” meaning that the “vileness, the inhumanity, the 
incompatibility of alien races is being steadily exaggerated.”79 The epistemic vacuum of the 
Balfourian age was filled by pseudoscience, as naïve (and malign) thinkers donned the scientific 
mantle of Darwin. Race prejudices were “shaping policies and modifying laws,” and they would 
cause a “large proportion of the wars, hardships and cruelties the immediate future holds in store 
for our earth.80 Racial bigotry underwrote such dangerous ideologies as Anglo-Saxonism and 
Pan-Germanism. Philosophy, then, was no cloistered pursuit, devoid of social significance; the 
fate of the world depended in part on the spread of pragmatist ideas that would counter the 
fetish for generalising about racial difference and competition.81 
 
Contemporary racial theory had two main sources: philology and biology. Wells had first 
criticised philology in Anticipations, dismissing the “[u]nobservant, over-scholarly people” who 
“talk or write in the profoundest manner about a Teutonic race and a Keltic race.” Since those 
races had never existed, such claims were little more than “oil-lamp anthropology,” possessing 
the same scientific credibility as Lombroso’s absurd studies of skulls.82 In A Modern Utopia Wells 
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blamed the influential Oxford philologist Max Müller for initiating the fruitless search for a “new 
political synthesis in adaptable sympathies based on linguistic affinities,” a search that had 
spawned endless celebratory accounts of English Teutonism, including J. R. Green’s popular 
History of the English People.83 Wells had picked an appropriate target. Müller’s work underpinned 
the “comparative method” propagated by Henry Maine, Edward Augustus Freeman, and J. R. 
Seeley among others, and it played a fundamental role in shaping late Victorian political science 
and history writing on both sides of the Atlantic.84 Yet for Wells it was based on the 
“unaccountable assumption” that language “indicated kindred” – that the (purported) common 
language of the Indo-Europeans connoted a shared “Teutonic” descent. There was no evidence 
for this dangerous “speculative ethnology.”85 A framework that exerted a deep influence on 
contemporary social science was based on fundamental mistakes about classification and 
generalization. 
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More dangerous still, Darwin’s ideas were being misappropriated. “The natural tendency of every 
human being towards a stupid conceit in himself and his kind, a stupid depreciation of all 
unlikeness, is traded upon by this bastard science.”86 Instead, Wells cited Joseph Deniker’s The 
Races of Man as an authoritative view of the best available science. Deniker, a French 
anthropologist, had created an intricate cartography of the peoples of Europe, concluding that 
“race” was an unhelpful term.87 Wells agreed, arguing that there were “probably” no distinct 
“pure” races in the world. Metaphysics reinforced the latest biological findings. The philosophy 
of uniques demonstrated that the “mania” for race was fundamentally misguided. Races, he had 
written in the introduction to A Modern Utopia, “are no hard and fast things, no crowd of 
identically similar persons,” but instead “massed sub-races and tribes and families each after its 
kind unique, and these again are clusterings of still smaller uniques and so down to each several 
person.”88 Humanity was composed of a fluid mosaic of peoples, not homogenous groups that 
could be ranked and compared. The fetish for classification was a serious impediment to 
comprehension. “The natural tendency,” he wrote, “is to forget all this range directly ‘race’ 
comes under discussion, to take either an average or some quite arbitrary ideal as the type, and 
think only of that.” Yet it was essential to “bear the range in mind” – “[i]t is not averages that 
exist, but individuals.” Since all persons were “individualized,” Wells rejected claims that racial 
difference was inherent and “insurmountable.”89 Produced by a toxic mixture of ignorance and 
poorly-digested science, it was a social construct not an ineliminable biological fact. He stressed 
the value of photographic collections such as The Living Races of Mankind, visual records that 
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showed people from around the world looked familiar. “There are differences, no doubt, but 
fundamental incompatibilities – no!”90  
 
Wells had a chance to test his views on race when he visited the United States in 1905. He wrote 
about his impressions in The Future in America, a book that generated significant attention. In 
Chapter 12, “The Tragedy of Color,” he turned to the fate of African-Americans. Horrified by 
what he found, Wells lamented the violence and injustice meted out by the white population, 
especially in the southern states. He was impressed by Booker T. Washington, who managed, 
Wells reported in a sympathetic portrait, to communicate the “monstrous injustice” of American 
racial bigotry, while arguing that “in our time and conditions it is not to be fought about.” In 
contrast, he noted that W. E. B. Du Bois, “the other great spokesman color has found in our 
time,” loudly denounced injustice, demanding that African-Americans be treated as equal 
citizens.91 Thus Wells waded into a fierce debate about the nature of resistance to white 
supremacism. Du Bois had attacked Washington’s meliorative program in The Souls of Black Folk 
(1903), which Wells cited in his discussion.92 Wells was not an uncritical admirer of Washington. 
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He praised him as a “statesman,” capable of grasping “the situation and destines of a people,” 
and suggested that his approach to racial injustice – prioritising black economic self-sufficiency 
over social equality and full political participation – had a greater chance of success than Du 
Bois’s otherwise justified anger, but he criticised Washington’s vision of racial co-existence on 
the grounds that it presupposed much higher levels of education than were evident among the 
white population.93 Ignorance bred injustice. The likely result of this lamentable state of affairs 
was the continued persecution of racial minorities.  
 
For Wells the key to creating a tolerant society was a combination of socio-economic reform and 
better education. Such education – informed by a healthy dose of philosophical pragmatism – 
would immunise people against the dangers of racial othering. “Ignorant people can think only in 
types and abstractions, can achieve only emphatic absolute decisions.” But enlightenment was a 
distant prospect. Most white Americans were incapable of thinking rationally about race, 
preferring to trade in crude stereotypes. “Uneducated men are as bad as cattle in persecuting all 
that is different among themselves.”94 The British were little better. Settlers in the Cape, for 
example, displayed the same attitude: “the dull prejudice; the readiness to take advantage of the 
‘boy’; the utter disrespect for colored womankind; the savage, intolerant resentment, dashed 
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dangerously with fear, which the native arouses in him.”95 Although Wells’s discussion was 
peppered with derogatory essentializing comments – African-Americans were presented as vain, 
innocent, and romantic, while Jews were characterised as greedy, self-serving, and dishonest – his 
anger at racial injustice was palpable.96 
 
Cornel West once observed that American pragmatist philosophers tended, like most of their 
fellow citizens, to evade wrestling with questions of race. “If a Martian were to come down to 
America and look at the American pragmatist tradition, they would never know that there was 
slavery, Jim Crow, lynching, discrimination, segregation in the history of America.”97 Peirce and 
James had little to say on the subject, while Schiller was a zealous advocate of the British empire 
and racial-civilisation hierarchies.98 Although a critic  of biological accounts of race, Dewey, in 
his writings about education before the First World War, defended an account of civilizational 
development and genetic psychology that, in combination, produced an ethnocentric vision of 
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the backwardness of non-white peoples.99 Some African-American scholars, influenced by the 
swirling pragmatist current, elaborated arguments about the sociology and politics of race. The 
most sophisticated were produced by Du Bois and, a decade or so later, the philosopher Alain 
Locke, though it is only in recent years that they have become canonical.100 Wells’s writings on 
racial “science” and prejudice – especially those found in the best-selling A Modern Utopia – were 
among the most widely-circulated early pragmatist accounts of the subject. 
 
Wells’s account of race attracted considerable interest. Horace Kallen’s famous essay 
“Democracy versus the Melting Pot,” invoked Wells as an authority on Jewish immigrants in the 
United States, as did Stanton Coit, the American-born founder of the Ethical Union movement, 
in his work on the sociology of religion.101 His account of racial bigotry also found an 
audience.102 He even provoked a book-length rebuttal, Through Afro-America: An English Reading of 
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the Race Problem (1910), from the journalist and critic William Archer, who dedicated it to Wells, 
“with whom I so rarely disagree that, when I do, I must needs write a book about it.”103 
Combining travelogue across the southern states, Cuba, and Jamaica, with potted sociopolitical 
analysis, Archer addressed the “problem of the color line” to shed light on racial conflict in the 
British Empire. He assessed various plans for resolving the “race problem”– including those of 
Du Bois, Washington, Josiah Royce, and Sydney Olivier – but focused much of his fire on 
Wells.104 Rejecting Wells’s suggestion that improving education was essential for a flourishing 
multiracial society, Archer argued that racial hostility was grounded in human nature – white 
animosity towards black people was “an unalterable fact of white psychology” – and could not 
be overcome. Consequently, he advocated the creation of a new state within the Union to house 
the black population. Since “race problems” only arise when different races “are found 
occupying the same territory,” the best solution was to separate them. Wells, by contrast, had 
praised Oliviers proposal to grant the “colored man a share in legislature and judicature under 
special conditions,” though he didn’t discuss what this would entail, or how it might be brought 
about.105 
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Despite his disavowal of racial science, Wells ended up painting a racialised picture of world 
order. In part, this was because he lacked a coherent account of equality. He argued that 
assumptions about the equality of humans had been discredited by Darwin – people were more 
or less equal along different dimensions.106 Some people were strong, some were weak; some 
were intelligent, others were not. Moreover, blanket claims about equality were incompatible 
with adherence to a nominalist metaphysics of the unique. Equality, then, was not an “objective 
fact” but “purely a convention of conduct and intercourse,” and valorising the “false 
generalization” of equality hindered the “treatment of the individual upon his merits.”107 It was 
better, Wells suggested, to acknowledge empirical inequality but uphold an ideal of equality 
before the law. “In a really civilized community equality and mutual respect must be the primary 
assumption of all social intercourse.” Such a view, he continued, “must not blind one to the real 
differences of personal quality,” including “such a fact as that a negro is usually simpler, kinder 
and stupider than a Beacon street Bostonian.”108 Wells’s critique of equality thus acknowledged 
empirical differences between individuals – fitting his nominalist metaphysics and underwriting 
his account of the role of technocratic elites in shaping progress – while defending the social 
value of the rule of law. However, he did not specify how these divergent accounts of equality 
could be reconciled.  
 
In addition, Wells’s eugenic commitments undercut his putative anti-racism. The clash was at its 
most stark in Anticipations. While clear that there were no distinct races, his proposed treatment 
of the “inefficient” people of “the abyss” disproportionately affected non-white populations. “It 
has become apparent,” he warned,  
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…that whole masses of human population are, as a whole, inferior in their claim upon 
the future to other masses, that they cannot be given opportunities or trusted with power 
as the superior peoples are trusted, that their characteristic weaknesses are contagious 
and detrimental ion the civilising fabric, and that their range of incapacity tempts and 
demoralises the strong. To give them equality is to sink to their level, to protect and 
cherish them is to be swamped in their fecundity.109  
 
The “efficients” of the future would have to devise policies to accommodate these facts, aiming 
to “check the procreation of base and servile types,” even engaging in the “merciless obliteration 
of the weak.” For example, those with transmissible diseases would not be allowed to procreate, 
while the death penalty would be enforced for grave crimes. All of this necessitated a recoded 
understanding of death. The extermination of the “unfit” should be seen as a form of social 
hygiene, good for both society and those killed. The hard-headed citizens of the New Republic 
would “have little pity and less benevolence” for the swarming masses of humanity, “helpless 
and useless, unhappy or hatefully happy in the midst of squalid dishonour, feeble, ugly, 
inefficient, born of unrestrained lusts.”110 How, he asked, would the New Republicans “treat the 
inferior races” – the ‘black,’ the ‘yellow,’ and that alleged termite in the woodwork, the Jew?” 
 
Certainly not as races at all. It will aim to establish, and it will at last, though probably 
only after a second century has passed, establish a world-state with a common language 
and a common rule … It will, I have said, make the multiplication of those who fall 
behind a certain standard of social efficiency unpleasant and difficult, and it will have cast 
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aside by coddling laws to save adult men from themselves. It will tolerate no dark corners 
where the people of the abyss may fester, no vast diffused slums of peasant proprietors, 
no stagnant plague-preservers. Whatever men may come into its efficient citizenship. It 
will let come – white, black, red, or brown; the efficiency will be the test.111  
 
Eugenic annihilation was not distributed equally. A minority of “white and yellow” peoples would 
be joined, he predicted, by a majority “of the black and brown races.”112  
 
In subsequent writings Wells dropped some of his most radical eugenic proposals. Indeed he was 
often seen as a hostile critic of the eugenic programmes advocated by many members of the 
Sociological Society.113 “It is in the sterilisation of failures, and not in the selection of successes 
for breeding,” Wells wrote in A Modern Utopia, “that the possibility of an improvement of the 
human stock lies.”114 Such improvement would be achieved through careful legal regulation and 
financial inducements, not violence. Although he had dropped his earlier exterminationism, the 
interlacing of race and eugenics remained. Questioning whether there were “inferior” races, he 
was adamant, contra Aristotle, that “there is no such thing as a race superior enough to have 
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tutelage over others.” But if there were “inferior” races, what role could they play in a utopia 
bound by Malthusian population constraints? The answer: they had to be “exterminated.” Recent 
history offered several models. They could be killed in the “old Hebrew fashion,” with “fire and 
sword,” or they could be enslaved and worked to death, as the Spanish did to the Caribs. 
Alternatively, they could deliberately exposed to disease, a strategy that missionaries had 
employed in Polynesia. Another option was “honest simple murder,” as the English had 
employed against the Tasmanians. Finally, one might adopt a more enlightened form of 
annihilation, establishing conditions that conduced to “race suicide,” as British imperial 
administrators had done in Fiji. Wells concluded that the Fijian option was the least cruel, 
although he doubted that there was such a thing as an inferior race: even the Australian 
“‘blackface’ isn’t such.” Utopia nevertheless required a strategy to deal with the unfit. Public 
policies would be designed “without any clumsiness or race distinction.” Fitness not group 
identity was the key.115 However, Wells said little about whether fitness was equally distributed 
across populations, or whether he still believed that it was concentrated (though not exclusively) 
in certain groups. His updated utopian picture was ambiguous at best. While disavowing racial 
discrimination, and presenting a picture of a world characterised by harmony and peace, he left 
open the question of how different populations would be affected by the eugenic order that was 
necessary to govern social life. 
 
Moreover, despite Wells’s scepticism about racial theorising, he believed in the cultural and 
political superiority of the “English-speaking peoples.”116 They were united by a shared history, 
institutions, and, above all, a language, not biological inheritance. In Anticipations he predicted 
that by the end of the twentieth century the United States and Great Britain would constitute a 
single political community, set to govern much of the world. In Mankind in the Making he was 
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clear that this emergent polity was the true home of his New Republicans – the very “ideal of the 
Republic” was, he confirmed, “addressed to, and could by adopted by, any English-reading and 
English-speaking man.”117 Wells clearly regarded this as desirable, envisaging the English-
speaking peoples acting as the precursor for a future world state. He reiterated the argument in 
Mankind in the Making. The Future of America, meanwhile, contains extended passages criticising 
European immigrants arriving in the United States as a threat to American stability and progress. 
Here, and elsewhere, he offered stark warnings about the “vast torrent of strangers, speaking 
alien tongues, inspired by alien traditions, for the most part illiterate peasants and working-
people,” who were flooding American cities.118 Although such claims were not grounded in racial 
“science,” they aligned neatly with the wave of xenophobic fears about immigration pulsing 
through the United States and the British settler colonies.119 When Anticipations was reissued in 
1914, Wells wrote in a new preface that the chapter predicting this future geopolitical 
constellation held up remarkably well. “For the most part it might have been written 
yesterday.”120 He insisted that this community was grounded in a shared language, not in race, 
and he was scathing about the pervasive ideology of “Anglo-Saxonism,” viewing it as a 
fundamentally misleading classification. Yet the political entailments of his argument were often 
hard to disentangle from the dominant racial discourse. It is thus unsurprising that he was 
sometimes interpreted as an Anglo-Saxon supremacist. In a review in Nature, Frederick Headley 
charged Wells with endorsing the view that “Anglo-Saxonism will eventually triumph,” to which 
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Wells responded furiously that he had said no such thing. “I repudiated this balderdash with 
some asperity.” Headley apologised for using the term “Anglo-Saxon,” while reiterating his point 
about the basic structure of Wells’s geopolitical forecasting.121 He had a point. While arguments 
grounded in language and the “Anglo-Saxon race” were conceptually distinct, the political 
upshot was not always easy to distinguish. 
 
Wells among the Social Scientists 
 
Wells’s methodological writings on social science attracted little attention at the time, though 
they did not sink without trace. John Beattie Crozier was unimpressed by his foray into 
sociology. Author of the eccentric two-volume History of Intellectual Development, and a firm 
believer in racial hierarchy and British imperial virtue, Crozier was aggrieved by Wells’s assault 
on the scientific aspirations of the Sociological Society, and on his own work. He responded with 
a vitriolic article, “Mr H. G. Wells as a Sociologist,” published in the Fortnightly Review in 
September 1905. While professing to have enjoyed A Modern Utopia, Crozier denied that it 
exemplified a new way of doing sociology. Instead, he argued, Wells’s account was fatally flawed. 
Its critical edge was blunted by a misguided view of classification. Sociology, Crozier lectured, 
“deals entirely with the laws of men in the mass, who can be predicted not to fly off at a tangent 
from each other, but to follow their chosen leaders as surely, if not quite as regularly, as sheep, 
whether it be in matters of taste, of fashion, of art, of politics, or of religion.” Rejecting the 
significance of Wells’s nominalism, Crozier asserted that classification and generalisation were 
essential methods of inquiry. He was equally scathing about Wells’s utopian alternative. 
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According to Wells, Crozier argued, “[a]ll you have to do” was “hoist your Utopia on high…and 
get men to gaze at it until they become thoroughly hypnotised and possessed by it.” Wells did 
not posit any criteria for adjudicating between utopias, and nor did he provide a transition theory 
to explain how his own preferred utopia could be realized. Crozier finished by lambasting Wells’s 
“immeasurable complacency,” and admonishing the “tone” of his remarks about Comte, 
Spencer, Kidd, Westermarck, Steinmetz, and himself.122 Wells fired off a response to the 
Fortnightly, reaffirming his “aggression upon the scientific claims of sociology,” and damning the 
efforts of Kidd, Spencer, Comte and Crozier as “interesting intellectual experiments of 
extraordinarily little permanent value.”123  
 
Wells’s lecture at the LSE also provoked a hostile reaction from the gathered members of the 
Sociological Society. This was unsurprising, for, as George Bernard Shaw observed waspishly, 
Wells was ultimately demanding that existing approaches should be replaced with the kind of 
speculative literary work that had made him famous.124 Admitting that it was still in a “very 
nebulous condition,” Benjamin Kidd defended the potential scientific validity of sociology 
against Wells’s “drastic” attack.125 Pointing to the success of the natural sciences, the eminent 
neurosurgeon and social psychologist Wilfred Trotter asserted the value of generalisation and 
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classification, while the Comtean economist S. H. Swinny castigated Wells for misunderstanding 
his hero. Geddes, chairing the session, lamented the “scarifying form” of Wells’s critique, but 
thanked him for introducing discussion of the “Platonic ideal and method,” and wondered, 
predictably enough, whether it might be adapted for urban planning.126 Only Goldsworthy 
Lowes Dickinson, the Cambridge philosopher – another favourite of William James – came to 
his defence, endorsing both Wells’s critique of objectivity in social analysis and his utopian 
programme. Once again, Wells gave no ground, reiterating his argument about the impossibility 
of prediction. “I do not think you are ever going to foretell in sociological science.” Trotter and 
Edward Urwick later criticised Wells’s position in the pages of the Sociological Review.127 In 1918 
the philosophers H.J.W Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead dug it out, challenging Wells’s account 
of the “social idea.” A decade earlier Muirhead had anointed Wells “the latest and most brilliant 
recruit…to philosophy as well as to Pragmatism.”128 Now, in their attempt to restate neo-
Hegelian idealism, he and his co-author insisted that Wells had been wrong to disregard the 
possibility of a science of society dedicated to tracing the “reality and direction of social 
purpose.”129 But such an engagement was unusual, and Wells’s arguments sank from view. This 
is not quite the the end of the story, however. In recent years the social theorist Ruth Levitas has 
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sought to rehabilitate the Wellsian vision, arguing that during the twentieth century sociology 
embarked on an unfortunate detour in seeking to establish itself as a science. It would be much 
better, she suggests, to follow Wells’s demand for a sociological mission dedicated to the pursuit 
of utopia. The early years of the field contain the seeds of its future development.130 Wells would 
have been delighted that he still has a place in the dreambook.  
 
In contrast to his methodological intervention, Wells’s substantive political and sociological 
writings garnered wide attention. Indeed he was a prominent fixture in early twentieth century 
social science throughout the “New Republic.” His books were reviewed in the leading social 
science journals, and he was routinely cited in public debates. He made a particular impression in 
the United States. Acclaim was far from universal – while some hailed him as a sage, others 
dismissed him as a superficial amateur.131 Charles Ellwood, one of the most prominent 
sociologists of the day, pinpointed Wells’s “individualistic pragmatism” in his review of Wells’s 
“delightful book,” First and Last Things, but he concluded that “it is no unkindness to say that Mr. 
Wells is a literary rather than a scientific man.”132 Most social scientists fell somewhere between 
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excited celebration and complete dismissal, mining Wells’s ever-expanding body of work for 
inspiration, concepts and hypotheses.  
 
Wells was frequently cast as an authority on particular subjects, notably eugenics, the family, and 
socialism. His work made several appearances in Robert Park and Ernest Burgess’s monumental 
Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921), a compendium of Chicago School insights, and the 
standard textbook during the interwar period. The authors referred to Wells as “our present 
major prophet” and listed his books as key bibliographical sources for a range of subjects, 
including “Social Forces” and “Social Disorganization.”133 He was a regular reference point in 
the work of the eminent Minnesota sociologist Arthur James Todd, who drew on Wellsian ideas 
about a plethora of subjects, including socialism, the family, education, utopianism, and the 
nature of social inquiry.134 Writing in 1919, the Columbia sociologist David Snedden, one of the 
most influential educationalists of the era, wrote that “H. G. Wells, perhaps more successfully 
than any other recent writer,” had contributed to the “quest of the thoughtful man of to-day in 
his attempts to reach the goal of constructive good citizenship amidst the complexities of the 
social order now evolving.”135 Wells appeared repeatedly in Snedden’s Educational Sociology (1922), 
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his books listed as essential reading on “Family Groups,” “Social Efficiency,” and “Social 
Education,” as well as under “essential Sociological References.”136 Other scholars referenced his 
work on the nature of the family, and in particular his support for the “endowment of 
motherhood.”137 
 
It is unclear how much Wells knew (or cared) about the intricacies of professional American 
sociology. He read widely but unsystematically across many fields, without developing deep 
expertise in any, and he rarely identified his sources. In his discussion of race, he praised a paper 
on the social and psychological roots of bigotry by W. I. Thomas, the doyen of the Chicago 
School.138  He was an admirer of Jane Addams and Du Bois. Intriguingly, Franklin Giddings, 
made a number of appearances in his work.139 In A Modern Utopia he described Giddings’s 
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Principles of Sociology – probably the most widely read America text among European sociologists – 
as a “modern and richly suggestive American work, imperfectly appreciated by the British 
student,” and during his trip to the US he visited Giddings, “whose sociological works are world-
famous,” in his office at Columbia, finding him “driven and busy.”140 The respect was 
reciprocated. After reading Wells’s The Future in America, Giddings wrote him a strikingly effusive 
letter. “It is a wonderfully true book, and I am deeply thankful that you have said to the 
American people all the things which it contains. As a general sociological description of the 
essentials of a big national society this study is immeasurably the best thing that has ever been 
done by anybody.”141 However, Giddings’s sociological work did not leave a lasting impression 
on Wells (or vice-versa). This is unsurprising, given that Giddings made his name defending a 
Spencerian evolutionary account of social development, and proselytised the importance of 
quantification and the scientific method in sociological research.   
 
Wells found an especially receptive audience among Progressive reformers. Charles Merriam, the 
ambitious Chicago political theorist, was a case in point. During the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Merriam observed in his seminal American Political Ideas, British writers, Wells 
included, exerted a substantial influence on the shape of American political thinking.142 “Often in 
the course of these essays,” he acknowledged, “I have quoted from H. G. Wells.” And indeed he 
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had, drawing on Wells’s views about the nature of authority and the character of the Gilded 
Age.143  
   
Wellsian ideas were partly channelled through the work of his friend and interlocutor Graham 
Wallas. The two men worked closely together in the first decade of the century.144 They shared a 
sceptical view of contemporary democratic theory and practice, as well as of abstract and 
idealizing methods for analysing society, believing instead that the application of psychology 
(especially of the Jamesian functional variety) offered a more realistic approach. Wallas was a 
huge admirer of Wells’s work. New World for Old was, he wrote, “far and away the best 
presentation of Socialism that exists,” and (like James) he predicted that it would be of “very 
great political importance.”145 Wallas’s classic Human Nature and Politics bore the imprint of their 
collaboration. He endorsed the nominalism defended by Wells in “Scepticism of the 
Instrument,” followed him in stressing the significance of educating citizens about the state, 
critically discussed the Platonic aspirations of A Modern Utopia, and invoked Wells’s concept of 
“de-localisation” to emphasize how new transport technologies were transforming society.146 
Reviewing the book in the Political Science Quarterly, Charles Williamson was struck by the “general 
similarity” between Wallas’s ideas and A Modern Utopia, and noted that Wells was cited more 
than any other author in the volume.147 Much more successful in the United States than in 
Britain, Human Nature and Politics came to be seen as a key contribution to both the emerging 
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field of political science and to wider public debate. The young Walter Lippmann was an ardent 
disciple, writing A Preface to Politics in part to spread Wallas’s views.148 The transatlantic reception 
of Wallas’s work helped to propagate Wellsian ideas.  
 
But Wells was also read in his own terms. William James’s most famous political tract, “The 
Moral Equivalent of War,” concluded by adopting a Wellsian argument about the value of 
military institutions in instilling social discipline.149 Two texts in particular made a mark on social 
scientists and political thinkers. New Worlds for Old was regarded as a seminal contribution to the 
rumbling debates over the meaning of socialism.150 The Future in America, moreover, was routinely 
cited as a source of productive insight about the social and political conditions of the United 
States. It should generate, James told him, “a lot of thinking in brains capable of it,” and it could 
be counted as “good a service as a foreigner has ever performed.”151 While it never reached these 
lofty heights, it did inspire much reflection. Wells’s warning about immigration attracted 
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considerable support.152 His account of American attitudes to the state also drew much 
comment. Wells had divined a pathological “state-blindness” – a lack of a “sense of the state” – 
as a defining characteristic of American society. Despite their proud patriotism, the typical 
American (male) citizen failed to recognise that “his business activities, his private employments, 
are constituents in a large collective process; that they affect other people and the world forever, 
and cannot, as he imagines, begin and end with him.”153 This myopic individualism 
simultaneously fuelled the hyper-competitive capitalist economy driving American growth and 
created the conditions – radical inequality and social dislocation – that were threatening its 
stability. The concept was utilised frequently by scholars and public intellectuals.154 The young 
political theorist Francis Coker praised Wells for illuminating the lack of political imagination in 
American public life.155 Wells had, wrote Garrett Droppers, an economist at the University of 
Chicago, “in a very acute way pointed out this characteristic quality of the American mind.”156 In 
his 1911 Presidential Address at the University of Minnesota, the sociologist George Vincent 
acknowledged the force of Wells’s charge, but countered that American attitudes to the state 
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were changing.157 The young intellectuals who founded The New Republic, many of them steeped 
in pragmatism, were admirers of Wells. He was one of Randolph Bourne’s early idols.158 In the 
Promise of American Life, arguably the most influential political treatise of the progressive era, 
Herbert Croly borrowed one of Wells’s key concepts from The Future in America to complain that 
America lacked a national “purpose.”159 Lippmann too drew freely on Wells, noting, among 
other things that “Scepticism of the Instrument” was the best accessible account of the critique 
of classification adduced by James and Bergson. Elsewhere he suggested that Wells and James 
“come nearer to having a vocabulary fit for political uses than any other writers of English,” as 
they had the rare ability to “convey some of the curiosity and formlessness of modern life.”160 
The critic Van Wyck Brooks viewed James’s influence more critically. In the first comprehensive 
study of Wells’s thought, he argued that the United State desperately needed such towering 
intellectuals to guide public debate, but he regretted that Wells’s pragmatism undermined his 
socialist credentials, driving him to over-emphasize psychology at the expense of material 
economic factors.161 But Brooks, like many of his contemporaries, recognised the significance of 
Wells as a thinker and acknowledged his influence on social and political thought.  
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In an article published in the Sociological Review in 1910 the critic S. K. Radcliff observed that 
Wells was widely regarded as a “sociologist first and novelist afterwards.”162 While mischievous, 
this characterisation contains an important truth: Wells made notable intellectual contributions to 
sociology on both sides of the Atlantic. His vision of social science encompassed critical and 
constructive elements. Both were infused with his pragmatist philosophical commitments. The 
critical project involved a rejection of the very possibility of social science. It drew heavily on his 
nominalist metaphysics, his scepticism about the fact-value distinction, and his view of the 
profound limits of human cognitive capacity and the signifying power of language. The 
constructive program insisted on the role of imagination in social thought and political action, 
and called for a “dream book” of utopian societies to stand at the beating heart of a newly-
constituted discipline. Wells was a pragmatic utopian: he viewed sociology as a fertile imaginarium, 
a source of ideas about how to radically improve society through understanding the historical 
development of a sense of collective consciousness, envisioning alternative futures, and 
motivating people to act on such visions.  
 
Although Wells’s utopian method attracted little support, his wider body of social and political 
analysis found a receptive audience, within and outside the rapidly-expanding university system 
of the Anglophone world. But as academic disciplines professionalised, and as Wells embarked 
on endless new pursuits, his influence on scholarly discourses waned, although it never 
disappeared entirely. In the interwar years, both The Outline of History and The Work, Wealth and 
Happiness of Mankind provoked the interest of social scientists, and arguably he exerted a 
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significant influence on mid-century thinking about international politics.163 But when 
disciplinary histories of the social sciences began to appear in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century, Wells usually warranted only a footnote, if he was mentioned at all. This 
would have surprised him and many of his contemporaries. 
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